new media?

Sacred to Commonweal was this net design’d
To pierce the heart and humanize the mind.
But if a hitless Blog, the Blogger’s curse,
Shows us our Thoughts and Reasons lose their force
Unwilling we must change the nobler scene,
And in our turn present you Celeb-queens;
Quit Poets, and set Journalists to work,
Show gaudy scenes, or mount the starring Buck:
For, though we Bloggers, one and all, agree
Boldly to struggle for our — vanity,
If want comes on, importance must retreat;
Our first, great, ruling passion, is — to eat.

informational insights from everyday decision-making

Persons tend to prefer what is familiar.  Political candidates, for example, heavily advertise themselves with signs and bumper stickers that typically include just the candidate’s name and office sought.  While voters find this same information on the ballot when they go to vote, repeated exposure to a candidate’s name evidently induces voters to prefer that candidate.  Brand advertising, which has been highly successful across a wide variety of media ecologies, is oriented toward the same effect.

Preferring the familiar favors survival in a wide range of actual human environments.  Because persons recognize dangers over time and avoid them, familiar surroundings are less likely to be dangerous than unfamiliar surroundings.  Persons who eat familiar foods are less likely to suffering poisoning than persons who eat unrecognized substances.  Familiar persons are more likely to offer help than are strangers.  Preference for the familiar is a simple decision rule that makes sense from evolutionary and ecological perspectives.

Preferring the familiar can produce good decisions on contrived tasks not directly related to familiarity. For example, presented in the laboratory with pairs of cities and told to choose which city is larger, students more often chose as larger a recognized city that was paired with an unrecognized city. Because actual patterns of conversation and media content refer to larger cities more often than smaller cities, choosing the recognized city identifies the larger city with better than random odds. In fact, on the pairwise city-size decision task, American students correctly choose the larger city more often for German city pairs than for American city pairs.  The opposite was true for German students.  This surprising result indicates the merits of the recognition heuristic.  The recognition heuristic can be applied only to city pairs for which one city is recognized, and one isn’t.  City pairs from a foreign country provided more scope for the recognition heuristic, and the recognition heuristic produced better decisions than decisions made when information could be recalled about both cities.[1]

Actual human decision processes point to important characteristics of practical decision logic. No formal decision logic can determine the scope of information that it considers. Every decision necessarily does not consider some possible information. An optimal decision is necessarily defined with respect to an assumed structure of information.  Recognition depends on biological capabilities, a wide range of life experiences, and non-problem-specific characteristics of the environment.  Recognition points to the huge scope of possibilities for useful information.[2]

More information, however, can make predictions less accurate.  In the real world, one does not know the data-generating process for the information under consideration.  Nor does one know whether that data-generating process is the same as the data-generating process relevant to the circumstances of the prediction.  Hence over-fitting and non-representative samples are always risks in real-world statistical applications.  More information can lead to a better estimate of the wrong data-generating process and hence worse predictions.[3]  The data-generating process for less information may be implicitly or explicitly better estimated and more consistent over time.  More information makes more known, but does not necessarily provide a better guide to the unknown.

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[1] Goldstein, Daniel G. and Gerd Gigerenzer, “Models of Ecological Rationality: The Recognition Heuristic,” Psychological Review v. 109, n. 1, pp. 75-90.

[2] Processing fluency at a lower level of sense than recognition is also important in decision-making.

[3] Thus, for example, in some situations the median, which uses only ordinal information, provides better predictions than the mean.  Gigerenzer, Gerd, “Why Heuristics Work,” Perspectives on Psychological Sciences v. 3, n. 1, pp. 20-9, provides a nice overview of how biology (“adaptive toolbox”) and real-world decision-making circumstances (ecological rationality) support fast and frugal heuristics.  Gigerenzer is an eminent academic and research leader in this field.  While I know much less, it seems to me that, in this short article, Gigerenzer doesn’t adequately distinguish between “irrelevant information (or ‘noise’ )” and model mis-specification / structural change.  If one knows correctly the data-generating process, larger sample sizes typically serve well to increase prediction accuracy in the presence of noise.  That’s not true for a mis-specified model.  Moreover, there is no statistical test for the true data-generating process for data not yet known.

Update:  Section 2 of Gerd Gigerenzer and Henry Brighton, “Homo Heuristicus: Why Biased Minds Make Better Inferences,” Topics in Cognitive Science 1 (2009) 107–143,  provides a good discussion of model mis-specification.  It uses the terms bias, variance, and noise in a way that might be jarring for someone focused on textbook statistics.  Textbook statistics, however, typically do not adequately recognize the reality that the true data-generating process is always unknown. Moreover, in practical circumstances the law of large numbers confronts important limitations:

  • increasing the sample size is often costly or not feasible
  • a larger sample may create greater model mis-specification because different data-generating processes may apply to different subsets of the sample
  • a larger sample enables greater over-fitting and increases the importance of correct parametrization

On the other hand, big datasets and complex algorithms have been successful in practical domains.

cheap physical distribution of video

Low-price rental of DVDs through kiosks is growing rapidly. Redstar, the industry leader, has grown from 6,700 video kiosks U.S-wide about January 2008 to more than 20,000 expected by year-end 2009.  In early May of this year, Video Business reported that DVDPlay had 1,200 kiosks and NCR had 2,200 MovieCube kiosks, with plans to add another 10,000 in a venture with Blockbuster.  All of these companies’ kiosks offer movie rentals on DVDs for $1 a day.

Low-cost media rental kiosks will press downward on prices for video distributed via communications network.  If the history of the book rental business is any guide, the video rental business will fade away as persons get video cheaply and conveniently through alternative sources, and as genres, formats, and entertainment options multiply.  The marginal cost of producing and distributing a video through a kiosk is much lower than the marginal cost of printing a book and distributing it through a book rental location (books have more atoms in more macroscopically different forms).  Thus for video the price pressure is likely to be greater, and the incentive to differentiate, also greater.  An interactive program of personalized short videos, which is what YouTube offers, can’t be delivered physically via DVD rentals.  If the video market shifts away from blockbusters, the capacity constraints of kiosks will be more of a disadvantage. Video kiosks are a potent disruption in the traditional video distribution business.  They will force communication networks to invest more in new video and entertainment forms that play to the advantages of online communication.

A fundamental aspect of the challenge of generating revenue from online content is that renting and buying don’t map well onto the online experience.  What’s the difference between renting and buying online content?  Renting offline means you have the right to use some good for a fixed period of time.  But online, which offers access to everything all the time, why would anyone ever pay for the right to use something ahead of the actual use time?  Buying offline is typically understood as possession: you get a good that you buy.  But what does buying a video that’s delivered online mean?  It means acquiring some bundle of rights that are not at all familiar or intuitive.  That’s a business problem.

The development of common understandings of new use rights would help to make online content more commercially feasible.  New digital use rights might include rights such as rights to make conversions across output devices, to construct new content compilations (playlists), and to make derivative works (mashups, adding audio content to user-generated videos).  Developing alternatives to totalitarian copyright is in content creators’  best interests.

inertia in administratively determined prices

Because communication networks were being used in ways that undermined the rate structure established to recover interstate public telephone service costs, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) created a special access surcharge.  This charge applied to interstate private lines that could connect with local public telephone service (“leaky PBX“).  Such facilities allowed persons to make interstate calls that avoided interconnection (access) rates associated with  interstate public telephone calls.  The special access surcharge recovered interstate public telephone service revenue that was lost when persons used private networks to transport calls interstate.

In its 1983 order establishing the special access surcharge, the FCC set the de facto rate. The order reasoned:

we note that private lines attached to a PBX are capable of ‘leaking’ into the local exchange. Because most private lines are connected to PBXs, most private lines are capable of leaking. Although one might assume that all private lines would leak if capable of doing so, we are aware of some private lines connected to PBXs that actually may not be used in connection with local exchange services to make interstate calls. We believe a fair estimate of the number of such lines would be 20 percent of all private lines. Thus, we estimate that 80 percent of all private lines do leak through a PBX or other patching or switching device. We shall assume that 8 percent of all communications made over such lines are interstate, based on the latest data available to us on average subscriber line usage for interstate MTS and WATS services.  Eight percent of 80 percent is 6.4 percent, which represents the proportion of all private line usage that ‘leaks’ into the local exchange. We further assume, based on estimates submitted in this proceeding, that nonpremium carriers would pay approximately $400-$500 in monthly carrier usage charge under the access charge plan.  Taking 6.4 percent of these figures, we arrive at a range of approximately $25-$32 per month per line. We will select the lower end of this range, $25, as a conservative estimate of what the interim surcharge should be.[1]

Under the regulations, a local-exchange telephone company had the opportunity to estimate and justify a different rate for a special access surcharge.[2]  Apparently none did.  At least for the large local-exchange telephone companies, the special access surcharge has remained at $25 per voice-grade-equivalent circuit from 1983 to the present.

The economic circumstances relevant to the special access surcharge have changed considerably since 1983. Most private line traffic is now non-voice traffic. Interstate public telephone service is now generally much cheaper than $25 per month. A special access surcharge applied to a DS3 line would raise the current price of that line more than ten-fold. In the mid-1980s, regulations were amended to permit customers to certify that a private line is not capable of being interconnected with a local exchange telephone line. Customers could thus get the special access surcharge waived. Such waivers would now seem relevant to almost all the voice-grade-equivalent circuits in private networks.

How the special access surcharge has been applied in practice isn’t clear. Local telephone companies’ special access surcharge revenue rose from 1993 to a peak of roughly $46 million in demand year 2001.[3] From demand years 1991 to 2008, the minimum, median, and maximum share of the special access surcharge in total special access and trunking revenue was 0.25%, 0.43% and 0.83%.  From 1993 to 2008 the ratio shows no clear trend.[4]  Thus the ratio does not indicate the rapid growth of IP-based networks across that period. While the special access surcharge rate of $25 has endured since 1983, it apparently hasn’t been consistently applied.

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Data:  online spreadsheet of special access surcharge revenue for selected telephone companies, 1991-2008 (Excel version).

Notes:

[1] FCC, Petitions for reconsideration of MTS and WATS Market Structure, CC Docket No. 78-72, 97 FCC 2d 682 (1983), para. 88.

[2] See 47 CRF 69.115 (special access surcharge regulations).

[3] Calculated from tariff data in the Price Cap Review Dataset. The 2001 peak is scaled up to an industry estimate using a dataset coverage ratio of 75%.

[4] Based on tariff date included in the Price Cap Review Dataset. The telephone companies included in the data for 1991 and 1992 are a subset of those included in subsequent years.