Japanese bandwidth prices in comparative perspective

In an infoworld article entitled “Government policies add to Japan’s broadband success,” Grant Gross led with this news:

A wide-ranging government policy on broadband and healthy competition among providers gives Japanese customers greater speeds at a much cheaper price than U.S. customers pay, a Japanese telecom executive said Wednesday.

Japanese customers pay about US$0.70 for each megabit per second of bandwidth, compared to $4.90 per megabit on average in the U.S., said Takashi Ebihara, senior director of the corporate strategy department at NTT East Corp. and a visiting fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington, D.C., think tank.

In an article in Silicon Valley Watcher, Richard Koman had a similar article headlined, “Why broadband is 5x cheaper in Japan.” Government policy is undoubtedly extremely important for the communications industry (and government bureaucrats deserve much more credit than they usually receive). A comparison between U.S. and Japanese bandwidth prices can be easily used to support conventional views about government policy and competition. Such a comparison can also be ignored if more convenient for a particular point of view.

Ebihara’s presentation was much more interesting than these news reports indicate. Ebihara actually compared bandwidth prices across twelve countries. Moreover, he cited a source for the data quoted above. His source was ITU Internet Reports 2005.[1] The table below includes all the relevant data given in that source. Thinking about policy and competition with respect to this set of countries and the range of prices that exists suggests that bandwidth prices are not strongly correlated with objective industry structures.

Internet Access Prices Per Megabit
Country or Region US$ Per Megabit
Japan 0.70
Korea (Rep.) 0.80
Taiwan, China 1.80
Iceland 2.00
Sweden 2.50
United States 4.90
Netherlands 7.30
Finland 7.30
Hong Kong, China    8.30
Canada 10.50
Macao, China 11.60
Belgium 12.20
United Kingdom 13.50
Singapore 15.90
Israel 32.50
Denmark 32.70
Switzerland 33.50
France 36.70
Norway 62.60
Austria 65.10
Source: ITU Internet Reports 2005

NTT’s current broadband service prices do not have a consistent bandwidth price level. ADSL has a price per megabit about three times higher than the price per megabit for Fiber To The Building (FTTB — used for multi-tenant buildings). Fiber to the Home (FTTH) is about two-thirds more expensive than FTTB. NTT’s ISDN, on a per megabit basis, is about two thousand times more expensive than its FTTB.

Current NTT Internet Access Services
Access Service Nominal Bandwidth Price (JPY) Equiv. Price USD USD per Mbps
FTTH 100 6,700 57 0.57
FTTB 100 3,950 34 0.34
ADSL 47 5,590 48 1.02
ISDN 0.064 5,200 44 687.50
Source: Ebihara presentation, p. 10

Bandwidth is more meaningful as a technical characteristic of a widely available service than as a good that users individually purchase. Most communications service users have little understanding of the concept of bandwidth. Most communication service providers do not guarantee the bandwidth of services purchased, nor define clearly what the nominal bandwidth of the service means. Moreover, the bandwidth of a “connection to the Internet” is no more meaningful than the bandwidth of a “connection to connections”.

A communications service business can be insightfully divided into two important activities. Building more capable communications networks and migrating users to them is one important activity for a communications business. In Japan, that is what NTT has done in shifting subscribers from ISDN to ADSL and then to fiber. Acquiring funds is another important activity for a communications business. Prices per megabit do not provide a good connection between these two aspects of a communications business.

OPLANs provides a useful alternative perspective on bandwidth prices. OPLANs emphasizes charging for access, not bandwidth. Thus an OPLAN is meant to be:

a network of truly ‘broadband’ capacity – i.e. where the bandwidth capacity is dictated by nothing other than physical characteristics of the deployed technologies [2]

With an OPLAN, users get to use as much bandwidth as they can. With modern fiber optics, that’s very high speed without any price. Moreover, that doesn’t depend on any particular national government policy, nor depend on competition.

Notes:

[1] See Taka Ebihara, Understanding the Japanese Broadband Miracle, p. 6, citing ITU Internet Reports 2005, p. 15.

[2] Malcolm Matson, “So What is an OPLAN?

new sports stars

Steve Outing observes:

For years, sports enthusiasts have read about their sports in magazines, mostly — with advice and celebrity profiles written by professional journalists and freelancers, and the occasional athlete. But what we’re seeing with the EG sites [here] (which are primarily about climbers/bikers/runners/et al sharing their own stories and images) is that people like being the writers and photographers themselves, and viewing the amateur musings of fellow enthusiasts who they can interact with easily and directly.

Some recent research is consistent with this view:

Advertisements featuring endorsements by celebrities such as David Beckham are less effective than those featuring ordinary people, new research suggests. This is because keeping up with the Jones’s rather than with famous people is the main motivation behind many people’s choice of which product to buy.[1]

Personally, I’m keen to keep up with my brother Dwight. But he is, in fact, a celebrity.

Note:

[1] Quoted from University of Bath press release (separate paragraphs condensed). The research that is the basis for this press release seems to be Torsten Tomczak, Daniel Wentzel, and Martin Brett, “Consumer Susceptibility to Normative Influence,” forthcoming in Journal of Advertising, 2007. While that journal bills itself as “the premier journal devoted to the development of advertising theory and its relationship to practice,” not making the paper and associated data freely available on the web makes this research less credible.

free manure

free manure

Available immediately in the Washington, D.C. area. I blacked out the last four digits of the phone number so that this generous supplier wouldn’t get inundated with prank calls. If you want manure, email me your telephone number and physical address so that I can confirm seriousness before sending you the full telephone number.

Craigsnumber is a simple way to get a disposable phone number that could be mapped to voicemail. Jaxtr is a much more capable widget-based service that generates local numbers for free voice calls. It’s designed for social networking sites and blogs. However, one could easily use it to generate disposable local numbers for posting publicly for particular purposes.

Since I hope not to be offering manure regularly on this blog, I’m not going to use such technologies here.

the big picture for voice call termination

On 27 March 2007, Ofcom released a statement setting mobile voice call termination charge controls for the next four years. These new charge controls replace charge controls set to expire 31 March 2007. The previous charge controls had been set for 1 September 2005 to 31 March 2006, but then had been extended for additional year. The previous charge controls had been subject to a lengthy, contentious appeal and a revision that eliminated separate control across rather different types of competitors (fixed-mobile termination vs. mobile-mobile termination). In conjunction with issuing the new charge controls, Ofcom began considering revising those controls in view of the impact of indirect routing for mobile number portability on the effective termination charge.

Inter-carrier compensation issues are quite difficult for regulators. Ofcom’s recent call termination statement comes about two years after Ofcom initiated formal consideration of new charge controls through publication of a document entitled Wholesale mobile voice call termination — a preliminary consultation (7 June 2005). Following that preliminary consultation were two other consultations, Wholesale mobile voice call termination — market review (30 March 2006), and Mobile call termination — proposals for consultation (13 September 2006).

Economic formalisms seem to constrain Ofcom’s ability to do sensible policy analysis. European Commission recommendations urge national regulatory authorities to define, “in accordance with the principles of competition law,” a relevant “market” for regulatory action to be “voice call termination on individual mobile networks” (see Framework Directive 2002/21/EC, Article 15). Ofcom carefully considered Significant Market Power (SMP), Countervailing Buyer Power (CBP), a “two-sided market” (that’s not meant to be a duplicative description; it’s an organization of transactions currently attracting attention in leading economic and business analysis), and a variety of other concerns of the type typically raised in competition cases. In line with EC recommendations, Ofcom then concluded:

There are separate markets for the provision of wholesale mobile voice call termination in the UK to other Communications Providers by each of Vodafone, O2, Orange, T-Mobile and H3G. (paragraph 1.10)

Ofcom deserves respect and appreciation for collecting considerable data and examining in detail the structure of mobile voice services and businesses. However, defining as “markets” individual companies’ mobile voice call termination services is conceptually absurd. Such “markets” are by definition “monopolized” by the company with respect to which they are defined.

Competition law should not be allowed to obtain a dominant position in communications policy analysis. A well-established, highly competitive symbolic market for legal and regulatory claims exists within the framework of competition law. That market spurs economic growth for lawyers, economists, regulatory affairs departments, technical consultants, etc. For more inclusive economic development, communication regulators should consider interconnection rules in relation to broad economic development goals.

Having communication service providers earn a large share of their revenue from basic voice communication is likely to impede growth in broadly capable networks and innovative communication services. Ofcom’s charge controls set mobile voice call termination rates about 5 pence per minute through 2011. Consider those charges with respect to some real-world communications development goals. Vermont, for example, is pursuing the goal of having for everyone, everywhere state-wide symmetric mobile data service of at least 3 Mb by 2010, and at least 20 Mb by 2013. Such development could easily support zero-price mobile call termination charges. On the other hand, if zero-price mobile termination charges would cause a major loss in revenue to mobile service providers, such charges are much less likely to occur. Through both regulatory lobbying and large expenditures on marketing and promoting, communications service providers can sustain prices with little relation to economic and technical aspects of reality.

Requiring communication providers who offer voice communication to accept voice communication from others at no charge to those others would help to deflate revenue from basic voice communication. One technical description of this sort of interconnection regime is “bill and keep“. Discussion of bill-and-keep has tended to focus on inter-carrrier compensation (pie splitting or money-routing) rather than on more important issues of industry structure. Regulation of mobile voice call termination rates has much broader implications for communication service users than pass-through of termination rate reductions or the particular circumstances of mobile voice calls. Regulation that supports per minute pricing of voice communication through the year 2011 does little to foster important communications possibilities that are already clearly visible.