al-Jahiz’s profoundly serious work on scholarly hospitality

In today’s universities, stern professors labor to problematize, complexify, and obscurate.  In ninth-century Baghdad, world-leading in population size and scholarly development, many scholars behaved similarly.  But not al-Jahiz.  Al-Jahiz wrote profound, important, and highly entertaining works on subjects from animals to eloquence.  Al-Jahiz ridiculed other scholars’ pretenses of seriousness through the form and substance of his own, hospitable work.

al-Jahiz's view of the books of grammarians and others

In his essay “Inside, Outside & Back to Front,” al-Jahiz mocks scholarly disputes between originalist interpretation of the Qur’an and Qur’anic interpretation that emphasizes rational purposes and consequences.  Some scholars asserted that the text of the Qur’an, like God, predates the creation of the world.  These scholars focused understanding on the words of Qur’anic passages in making legal judgments.  Other scholars asserted that God created the Qur’an, like God created all living creatures.  This living Qur’an school emphasized rational analysis of a Qur’anic passage’s purpose and consequences in relation to legal judgments.  Trials before the supreme court in the early Abbasid Caliphate focused on this matter of interpretation with life-and-death opinions at stake.[1]

Al-Jahiz pruriently recast the dispute between the originalist-text and living-text legal schools.  A pun in Arabic associates the originalist and living legal schools with the back and front of the body, respectively.  Addressing a dear young friend who lavishly praised the back, al-Jahiz argues vigorously for men taking the frontal path:

It is common practice to describe a man as having been known for certain qualities since the time he emerged “from his mother’s belly” but not “from his father’s back.”  … A man can have “inside knowledge” of events but not a “backside knowledge” of them. … If the only good thing about the front was a comely face and the only bad thing about the back was that it incorporates the buttocks, that alone would be a clear indication of the merit of the belly and the baseness of the back.  …  the brave man is described as “going boldly forward,” the coward as “turning his back.”  There is a world of difference between the man who meets his enemy head on and the one who shows him the back of his head, or between the screwer and the screwed, the rider and the ridden, the doer and the done to, the one who comes and the one come on … The merits of the back would only be described by a man besotted by them, addicted to riding them, itching to sleep with them and hooked upon chasing them: a man at odds with the law, who has strayed from the straight and narrow and severed his connections  with common decency — in other words, an habitual felon, an inveterate backslider, a persistent suborner and a confrere of sinners and deviants. [2]

Al-Jahiz disparages scholars who engage in sloppy reasoning, deliberately subvert truth, and promote lies and vice.  He expresses faith that his friend’s reasonableness will allow him to be turned from the back to the front.  He prays that God will lead us from the front and that we will not turn our back on God.  Al-Jahiz deploys these common argumentative tactics in conjunction with his insistent and outrageous punning.  After al-Jahiz’s essay, a vicious argument between originalist and living-text legal scholars could easily generate involuntary laughter.  That’s serious scholarly work.

In his essay “Drink & Drinkers,” al-Jahiz ridicules scholarly disputes about the legality of alcoholic drinks.  The Qur’an declares that wine is sinful, an abomination, and to be avoided.  The Qur’an also declares that the righteous in paradise will have “rivers of wine, a joy to those who drink.”[3]  Understanding these passages and the legal status of alcoholic drinks other than wine are matters of interpretation.  Islamic scholars have actively debated these legal issues.  Al-Jahiz first approaches these legal issues with detailed, contradictory, and absurd lists of consequences of drinking:

Vintage toddy clears the mind, invigorates the body and puts backbone and heart in a man. … It banishes flatulence and wind and gets rid of bile and phlegm.  It promotes good will and giving.  … It is a faithful companion when one’s lonely.  …{on the other hand} it loosens the tongue and adds to the level of nonsense around.  It causes bad temper and incontinence.  … {The drunk man} dribbles down the front of his tunic and throws up the last meal that he ate. [4]

After he has established that reasoning through such consequences is ludicrous, al-Jahiz focuses on enticing descriptions posed as legal questions:

What is your view of the fine raisin toddy of Homs or the stuff that is made from white honey?  With its rose-red colour glowing behind a patina of gold, it looks like sunlight captured in a glass and laughter in the palm of your hand.

What about the juice of bruised grapes, heated to help it along and aged in the jar to perfection?  When opened, its bouquet suffuses the air.  Its colour has the brilliance of garnets, set in a bed of bright rubies.  It gleams in the glass like newly minted dinars and sparkles like a meteorite shower. [5]

Arguing from an originalist-textualist view (the back orientation), al-Jahiz rejects the claim that God’s intent was to forbid all alcoholic drinks.  God in the Qur’an singled out wine for prohibition.  Al-Jahiz, essentially asserting the interpretive principle that English common law later called expressio unius est exclusio alterius (“the express mention of one thing excludes all others”), argues that God’s plain-statement prohibition of wine means that other alcoholic drinks are legal.  Al-Jahiz’s main point, however, seems to be more about aridity of legal disputes.  He observes:

If the nature of the debate about intoxicating drinks was of the same order as the controversy between the proponents of different singing styles and rhythms, delivery, tone and metre, the lengthening and elision of notes, the role of the breath, throat, palate and uvula, the right amount of string tension to produce the finest sound, the correct place to insert a glottal stop or vocalize a consonant with “u”, whether the “quick” metre is more suited to the first or second string or whether a gently descending scale is more melodious than a rapidly declining one — if the argument was of that order, the matter would be simple and I would defer to anyone laying a claim to knowledge superior to mine.  However, I debate with no one whose knowledge is inferior. [6]

Despite the legal disputes, al-Jahiz and his interlocutors have extensive lips-on experience of intoxicating drinks.  In the matter of intoxicating drinks, the originalist-textualist interpretation of the Qur’an kisses experience as the logic of the law.  Al-Jahiz’s essay supports the legal principle, obscured in bitter legal arguments, that some pleasures are licit.

In his essay “The Pleasures of Girls & Boys Compared,” al-Jahiz takes scholarly discussion of sexual pleasure to popular obscenity.  Debating the merits of men having sex with boys relative to men having sex with women was a common literary theme in the ancient Greco-Roman world.[7]  Al-Jahiz does not attempt to outdo in eloquence and learning his literary predecessors.  Al-Jahiz’s opens his subject with lewdness.  He states that the pious ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Abbas, on pilgrimage to the holy mosque in Mecca, recited this verse:

If the words that a little bird tells me are true,
This woman who’s walking beside me, I’ll screw.

With implicit ridicule of legal scholar’s debates, al-Jahiz also reports that another pious man prayed:

Lord, make my penis as hard during intercourse at Your law permits.[8]

After such preliminaries, al-Jahiz moves on to the literary set-piece of a debate between a pederast and a fornicator.  While a similar debate that Plutarch stages in his Dialogue on Love is full of literary references and sophisticated rhetoric, al-Jahiz has the two sides showing little learning and mainly exchanging quotations of poetry.  Al-Jahiz ends the dialogue diffusely and then adds a section of popular obscene jokes.  Al-Jahiz thus strips the pretenses of the literary topos and exhibits its crude appeal.

Given the importance of hospitality in Arabic culture, al-Jahiz’s attacks on tedious and repulsive scholarly disputes and his formulation of much more hospitable alternatives are serious scholarly work.  Al Jahiz was neither merely an amusing writer, nor a serious scholar according to the dominant conventions of scholarly seriousness of his time, or ours.[9]  He apparently cared deeply for entertaining scholarly communication.  That’s an idea worth effort for scholars to understand.

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Notes:

[1] Under Abbasid caliph al-Ma’mun, legal scholars were required to testify as to whether the Qur’an was coexistent with God or created by God.  These proceedings are known as the Mihna.  Scholars determined to have incorrect beliefs about the createdness of the Qur’an were subject to torture and execution.  On the intellectual-political contours of the Mihna, see Hurvitz (2001).  Similar disputes existed in the ancient world regarding the creation of the world and the origin of medicine.  On originalist and living schools of legal interpretation in the U.S. today, see Scalia (1997) and Breyer (2005). Interpretation of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution is a prominent legal issue over which the originalist and living-text schools have clashed. The contemporary U.S. legal academy leans strongly toward the living-text school, while the originalist school was most popular among legal scholars in the ninth-century Abbasid caliphate.  That difference seems to be related to the underlying structure of the deliberative market: U.S. legal statutes can be changed and the U.S. Constitution can be amended, while the text of the Qur’an is given.

[2] Al-Jahiz, Risalah fi tafdil al-batn ‘ala al-zahr, trans. Colville (2002) pp. 64-65 (Inside, Outside & Back to Front). The translation in Hutchins (1989) (The Superiority of the Belly over the Back) is similar, but more literal and less colorful.  The authorial figure strongly condemns his interlocutor’s sexual orientation.  While expressing compassion for the interlocutor himself, the authorial figure appears self-centered, arrogant, and narrow-minded:

I have discovered a residue of sympathy for you in my soul and a feeling of pity towards you: it is only the afflicted who can be pitied.  All praise be to God for sparing me from the scourge which He has meted out to you and for making me superior to so much of His creation.

I believe that I should now conclude this essay with the simplest of prayers for you, so earning divine reward for myself.

Trans. Colville (2002) p. 68.

[3] Qur’an 2:219; 5:9, 90; 47:15.

[4] Al-Jahiz, Kitab al-sharib wa al-mashrub, trans. Colville (2002) pp. 135-36 (On Drink & Drinkers).  Hutchins (1989) doesn’t include this work.

[5] Trans. Colville (2002) p. 137. Abu Nuwas (lived from about 756 to 814 GC in Baghdad) is a classical Arabic poet widely regarded as having written the greatest poetry in praise of wine (khamriyyāt). In addition to writing explicit poems about men having sex with men, Abu Nuwas wrote more than four hundred wine poems.

[6] Id. p. 142.  Al-Jahiz criticized grammarians for unnecessary, tedious complexity, disparaged them for mainly being “tutors of adults and teachers of youngsters,” and pointed to their lack of relevance in broader social contexts.  Baalbaki (2009) pp. 104-5, 108-110.  In his Book of Animals, al-Jahiz stated:

I am completely infatuated with two things, listening to the accounts of the Bedouins and to the contending arguments of two opponents in theological disputation.  Nothing is better than these two; for both arouse amazing stores of good spirits that can hearten a bereaved person even in the extremities of sorrow, or cheer up an angry person even as the flames of rage consume him.  And if these two activities do not offer themselves, then one can find in all subjects sufficient types of entertainment, humor, pleasure, leisure, and distraction.

Trans. Heath (2009) pp. 168-9.  Al-Jahiz’s claim of infatuation with accounts of the Bedouins and contending arguments in theological disputations seems meant ironically.  The cultural elite of ninth-century Baghdad probably considered accounts of the Bedouins to be like accounts of Puritans and cowboys in contemporary American culture.  Consider, for example, al-Jahiz’s account of a love story of Jamil and Buthaynah.  Or ponder the position of al-Jahiz’s teacher al-Asma’i relative to Bedouin love. Moreover, most theological disputes in ninth-century Baghdad probably were as boring as most law review articles in the U.S. today.  Al-Jahiz engaged in theology, but across a much broader canvass of subjects and concerns than that of the typical legal scholar.  Like Galen, al-Jahiz vigorously engaged his opponents, but also despaired of the prevailing communicative competition:

{Al-Jahiz} wants to achieve the utmost clarity to make the fullness of commentaries and interpretations unnecessary.  On the other hand, he is convinced of the necessity of discussions, debates, and different criteria.  Different versions, even disagreements, are part of our linguistic activity and are not to be condemned.

Behzadi (2009) p. 132.  The challenge in deliberative market competition, just as in other areas of market competition, is to get competition that serves the public interest.  Not all forms of competition do so.

[7] See, e.g. Plutarch, Dialogue on Love (Erotikos/Amatorius), in Moralia, trans. Babbitt (1927) v. 9 (alt. 19th-century translation); Pseudo-Lucian, Affairs of the Heart (Amores), trans. Harmon; Achilles Tatius, Leucippe and Clitophon, 2:35-38, trans. Reardon (1989).

[8] Al-Jahiz, Kitab mufakharat al-jawari wa al-ghilman, trans. Colville (2002) pp. 203, 204 (The Pleasures of Girls & Boys Compared), for both quotes above.  Hitchens (1989) pp. 139, 141 (Boasting Match over Maids and Youths) has a much more literal translation of the first quote (poem).

[9] A leading scholar of al-Jahiz observed:

a tendency, almost universally discernible in the European persona of al-Jāḥiẓ, to seek refuge in humor, irony, and parody (all synonyms in the fabrication of this persona) when al-Jāḥiẓ in his writings refuses to conform to the very persona we have fashioned for him.  And this is a most comforting and facilitating hermeneutic circle in Jāḥiẓian studies: al-Jāḥiẓ is not a serious writer and therefore when he appears to be serious he must not be serious because he is not a serious writer.

It is not that al-Jāḥiẓ is not playful or that he does not voice his characters uttering jokes and witticisms—sometimes he also voices his own various auctorial personae as uttering these witticisms.  He does this often and repeatedly.

Montgomery (2011) p. 624.  The serious/not-serious dichotomy obscures al-Jahiz’s attempts at reforming serious scholarship.  Part of that attempted reform is to encourage others with a wide variety of capabilities to engage with scholarship to the extent of their capacities.  See Montgomery (2009) pp. 226-9.

References:

Baalbaki, Ramzi. 2009. “The Place of al-Jahiz in the Arabic Philological Tradition.” In Heinemann et al. (2009) pp. 92-110.

Babbitt, Frank Cole, trans. 1927. Plutarch’s Moralia. London: W. Heinemann.

Behzadi, Lale. 2009. “Al-Jahiz and his Successors on Communication and the Levels of Language.” In Heinemann et al. (2009) pp. 125-132.

Breyer, Stephen G. 2005. Active liberty: interpreting our democratic Constitution. New York: Knopf.

Colville, Jim, trans. 2002.  Al-Jāḥiẓ.  Sobriety and mirth: a selection of the shorter writings of al-Jāhiz. London: Kegan Paul.

Heath, Peter. 2009.  “Al-Jahiz, Adab, and the Art of the Essay.” In Heinemann et al. (2009) pp. 133-72.

Heinemann, Arnim, Manfred Kropp, Tarif Khalidi, and John Lash Meloy. 2009.  Al-Jāḥiẓ: a Muslim humanist for our time. Würzburg: Ergon Verlag in Kommission.

Hurvitz, Nimrod. 2001. “Miḥna as Self-Defense.”  Studia Islamica. 2001 (92): 93-111.

Hutchins, William M., trans. 1989.  Al-Jāḥiẓ.  Nine essays of al-Jahiz. New York: P. Lang.

Montgomery, James Edward.  2009.  “Al-Jahiz on jest and earnest.”  Pp. 209-39 in Tamer, Georges. 2009. Humor in der arabischen Kultur / Humor in Arabic culture. Berlin: De Gruyter.

Montgomery, James Edward.  2011. “Why al-Jahiz Needs Slonimsky’s Earbox.”  Journal of the American Oriental Society. 131 (4): 623-634.

Reardon, Bryan P. , ed.  1989. Collected ancient Greek novels. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Scalia, Antonin. 1997. A matter of interpretation: federal courts and the law : an essay. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

child support: judging misrepresentation & reliance in Shondel

On a visit to Guyana in 1995, Mark met and had sex with Shondel.  The record provides no indication that they intended their relationship to be anything beyond a short-term sexual affair.  After Mark returned to New York, Shondel became aware that she was pregnant.  She misrepresented to Mark (and subsequently to a U.S. family court) that she knew that the child was Mark’s.  Mark, living in New York, took some actions to support Shondel and the child, living in Guyana.  When the child was just under five years old, Shondel and Mark’s relationship deteriorated.  Shondel then sought court-determined financial child support from Mark.  A DNA test found that the child was not Mark’s biological child.  Nonetheless, a family court ordered Mark to pay to Shondel $78 per week as financial child support.  In the Matter of Shondel J. v. Mark D. (2006), the highest appellate court in New York State upheld that imposition of financial fatherhood on Mark.  What judicial reasoning supported this decision?

The appellate court’s decision rested on the reasoning of a child under five years old.  The court reasoned:

Mark represented that he was the father of the child, and she {the child} justifiably relied on this representation, changing her position by forming a bond with him, to her ultimate detriment.  He is therefore estopped from denying paternity. [1]

Legal obligations typically are based on representations among adults who have capacity to contract.  Here, the court attributes contracting capacity to a child from birth to just under five years of age.  The court further explained:

The potential damage to a child’s psyche caused by suddenly ending established parental support need only be stated to be appreciated.  Cutting off that support, whether emotional or financial, may leave the child in a worse position than if that support had never been given. [2]

Mark had no contact with the child from March, 2000 to the time of the court’s decision in July, 2006.  Mark did not intend to provide emotional support to the child or the child’s mother, or have any relationship with them at all, at any time in the future.  A court cannot compel emotional support. What’s called “child support” in this and similar cases has nothing to do with emotional support.  It’s money, pure and simple.  What financial obligation did the baby/young child perceive that Mark’s representations to her implied?  How did the baby change her behavior in response to her perception of Mark’s financial obligations to her?  How would Mark ceasing to provide financial payments to the young child make the child worse off than if Mark had never made any financial payments to her?  These questions baffle a reasonable adult.  Nonetheless, the appellate court, with keen understanding of the mind of a baby, perceived that the baby/young child’s reasoning justified New York State ordering Mark to pay Shondel $78 per week.

The court’s reasoning about how babies are made is similarly childish.  The court’s decision stated:

to the extent that it matters, we note that there is no evidence of fraud or willful misrepresentation even on Shondel’s part.  It is not likely that she would have initiated paternity proceedings, with the predictable prospect of biological testing, if she expected tests to rule him out as the father.  There is every reason to believe that she thought Mark was the biological father and that the tests would confirm her belief. [3]

Shondel believing that Mark is her child’s biological father is different from her knowing that Mark is the biological father.  She would know that Mark is the biological father only if she didn’t have sex with another man during the relevant period.  She did have sex with another man.  Hence she did not know who the biological father is.  That’s simple biology.  Pretending otherwise, at least among adults who know how babies are made, is willful misrepresentation.  That misrepresentation goes far beyond Shondel.  When imposing legal fatherhood on men, the U.S. legal system commonly misrepresents biological facts.

The court showed little concern for men’s choice.  Under a New York State statute, a court can order child support in ignorance of biological paternity “upon a written finding by the court that it is not in the best interests of the child on the basis of res judicata, equitable estoppel, or the presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married woman.”[4]  According to that literal statutory language, a court has authority to make a finding about the “best interests of the child” based on consideration of arcane and archaic legal concepts: “res judicata, equitable estoppel, or the presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married woman.”  That’s not common sense of the “best interests of the child.”  The statute thus permits, but does not require, courts to invoke paternity by estoppel to force financial fatherhood on a man.  With respect to the fundamental human value of becoming a father, New York State’s highest appellate court declared:

Given the {above described} statute recognizing paternity by estoppel, a man who harbors doubts about his biological paternity of a child has a choice to make.  He may either put the doubts aside and initiate a parental relationship with the child, or insist on a scientific test of paternity before initiating a parental relationship. A possible result of the first option is paternity by estoppel; the other course creates the risk of damage to the relationship with the woman. It is not an easy choice, but at times, the law intersects with the province of personal relationships and some strain is inevitable. [5]

Think of the child: what if the child calls you “daddy”?  Are you to cause potential damage to the child’s psyche by telling the child not to call you daddy?  More seriously, the court’s statement displays abstract legal complacency (“some strain is inevitable”) that jars painfully against the legal reality of undue influence, misrepresentation, and mis-service in the legal process of paternity establishment.  That structure of injustice is not inevitable.  Men could be given reasonable reproductive rights and good, meaningful opportunities to choose to be a father

In the U.S. legal system, the best interests of the child obliterates men as persons with rights under law.  In judging whether Mark should be compelled to make child support payments to Shondel for at least eighteen years, the highest appellate court in New York State declared:

the issue does not involve the equities between the two adults; the case turns exclusively on the best interests of the child.  … The child is entirely innocent and by statute the party whose interests are paramount. … Under the enactment, the mother’s motivation and honesty are irrelevant; the only issue for the court is how the interests of the child are best served. [6]

The claim that the statute obliterates the legal persons of adults shows the tenuous legal rights of adults in the U.S. today.  Just proclaim “Think of the children!” and an elaborate structure of rights, laws, and legal process turns into judges gravely pondering the “best interests” of a child that they do not know personally at all.

In legal decisions, judgments of the “best interests of the children” primarily camouflage judgments of other interests.  What a courageous scholar stated about child custody decisions applies equally well to decisions of legal paternity:

child custody cases are not really about children: they are about adults. What is especially interesting, however, is the extraordinary length to which adults go to deny this plain truth.  Ask any professional associated with child custody disputes and the one thing he or she is sure to emphasize is that their only purpose is to resolve the dispute “in the best interests of the child.”  As I hope to make clear, this is not simply false, it succeeds as a coverup to hide the degree to which the disputes serve adults’ interests. [7]

The child support system enforces a large transfer of money from men to women on the basis of nothing more than men having sex of reproductive type with women.  Both with respect to child welfare and gender equality, the “child support” system functions badly.  The legal doctrine “best interests of the child” serves to make impossible urgently needed systemic reform of family law.

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Notes:

[1] In the Matter of Shondel J. v. Mark D., 7 N.Y.3d (2006) at 328.  The extent of Mark’s relationship was a matter of highly conflicting claims in the Family Court.  The appellate court’s majority opinion and the dissenting opinion likewise present contracting pictures of Mark’s relationship with the child.  The majority opinion shows no appreciation for tactical behavior in a relationship and before a Family Court.  Such tactical behavior is common among humans.  The dissenting opinion describes relevant relational facts:

At the time of the paternity proceeding, the child had lived most of her life in a different country from Mark D., and their relationship was primarily on the telephone.

Id., Smith, dissenting opinion, at 335-6.

[2] Id., majority opinion, at 330.

[3] Id.

[4] N.Y. Family Court Act § 532 (a).

[5] Shondel J. v. Mark D. (2006), majority opinion, at 331-2.

[6] Id at 330, 331.

[7] Guggenheim (2005) p. 143.  See also id. pp. 153, 157-8. Cohen (2012a) and Cohen (2012b), addressing forward-looking and much less widely important policy issues, argue against the “Best Interest of the Resulting Child” (BIRC) legal justification.  Cohen declares “BIRC justifications are vacuous” and “the BIRC justification, at least stated as such, is problematic both as a normative and constitutional matter.”  Alvaré (2012), Crawford (2012), and Mutcherson (2012) take up the BIRC debate, with Cohen (2012c) responding.  The implications of this debate for the child support system remains to be worked out.

References:

Alvaré, Helen M. 2012. “A Response to Professor I. Glenn Cohen’s ‘Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests’.”  96 Minnesota Law Review Headnotes 8.

Cohen, I. Glenn. 2012a. “Beyond Best Interests.” 96 Minnesota Law Review 1187.

Cohen, I. Glenn. 2012b. “Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests.” 96 Minnesota Law Review 423.

Cohen, I. Glenn. 2012c. “Burying Best Interests of the Resulting Child: A Response to Professors Crawford, Alvaré, and Mutcherson.” 97 Minnesota Law Review Headnotes 1.

Crawford, Bridget J. 2012. “Authentic Reproductive Regulation.” 96 Minnesota Law Review Headnotes 31.

Guggenheim, Martin. 2005. What’s wrong with children’s rights. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Mutcherson, Kimberly. 2012. “In Defense of Future Children: A Response to Cohen’s Beyond Best Interests.” 96 Minnesota Law Review Headnotes 46.

about half of prisoners receive no personal visits from outside prison

Prisoners’ personal communication with persons outside of prison vary greatly.  About half of prisoners receive across their whole spell of incarceration no personal visits from persons living in the outside world.[1]  In Florida, prisoners who receive visits receive on average about one visit per month.  In Minnesota, prisoners who receive visits receive on average about three visits per month.  Compared to Florida prisons, Minnesota prisons are closer to the major cities where most prisoners originally lived.[2]  The lower travel costs of visiting prisoners in Minnesota is consistent with its higher visiting frequency among prisoners who receive visits.

Immediate family don’t predominate among prisoners’ visitors.  Spouses and significant others accounts for a much smaller share of visitors than do parents and friends.  Troubled personal and social relations often contribute to motivating the criminal acts that cause persons to be incarcerated.  Identifying persons who will maintain personal contact with a prisoner isn’t a simple matter of standard relational designations.  Friends account for a considerable share of personal visits to prisoners.

Despite the public importance of the criminal justice system and the extraordinarily high prevalence of incarceration in the U.S., community groups show relatively little personal engagement with prisoners.  Clergy, mentors, and other professionals account for less than 5% of visits that prisoners receive.[3]  Given high public concern about crime and the importance of prisoners’ contact with the outside world in lessening recidivism, much more civic engagement with prisoners would seem to be in the public interest.

Online video visitation can help to increase prisoners’ communication with the outside world.  Online video visitation with prisoners eliminates travel costs and lessens visit scheduling difficulties.  Online video visitation can help to increase personal contact among prisoners who have none with the outside world.  Online video visitation, by eliminating the significance of prison location, also supports more equal opportunities for prisoners to receive visits.

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Data:

Workbook of prisoner visiting statistics for Florida and Minnesota (Excel version), extracted from Bales & Mears (2008) and Duwe & Clark (2011) .

Notes:

[1] Based on visiting data for prisoners in Minnesota and Florida.  The average spell of imprisonment in the Minnesota sample is 20 months.  The Florida data, which show that 58% of prisoners receive no visits, cover the year before release from prison.

[2] See Florida and Minnesota prisoner visiting data.  In Florida, 30% of state prisoners lived in the Miami-Dade County area, but only 5% are held there. In Minnesota, most prisons are within 100 miles of the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, where about 40% of prisoners lived. Duwe & Clark (2011) pp. 3,4.

[3] See Florida and Minnesota prisoner visiting data.

References:

Duwe, Grant, and Valerie Clark. 2011. “Blessed Be the Social Tie That Binds: The Effects of Prison Visitation on Offender Recidivism.” Criminal Justice Policy Review. Published online before print December 6, 2011, doi: 10.1177/0887403411429724

Bales, William D., and Daniel P. Mears. 2008. “Inmate Social Ties and the Transition to Society: Does Visitation Reduce Recidivism?” Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency. 45 (3): 287 – 321.

misery of literary writers in the ancient Islamic world

the dream of literary writers often leads to misery

From the early Abbasid period, Arabic writers referred to the misery of literary writers.  With literary flair they used the punning phrase “hirfat al-adab.”  Hirfa meant both “profession” / “practicing a craft” and “misfortune” / “grief.” Adab meant display of verbal acuity and literary culture.  Hence “hirfat al-adab” meant both “exercising the profession of a man of letters” and “misery inherent in being a man of letters.”[1]  Intense literary status competition in the ancient Islamic world created considerable misery among literary writers.

How many are the ignorant enjoying a life of peace and joy while poverty and toil wear out the mindful.  Riches he finds among those who have no abilities, but fortune flees from those familiar with the art of the word.  (written by Nasr al-Khubzaruzzi, born in Basra, died between 929 and 942) [2]

The demand for literary talent, like that for fashionable clothes, is fickle and doesn’t readily provide material payment.[3] Well-established institutions of literary prestige limit status competition and can entrench within a society mediocre literary performances.  But seen from a different angle, those institutions give literary figures valued security of position and, in modern times, often at least a meager salary.

Writing well is hard work with relatively little reward.  That Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Tumblr have eclipsed long-form blogging isn’t surprising.

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Notes:

[1] Bonebakker (2001).  Many examples have survived from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Ibn al Sa’ati (d. 1209) wrote in verse:

I loathe poetry.  Never will I aspire to it!  I even loathe transmitting it in my writings.
I avoided composing it, not because it struck me as fearsome, but because I feared the misery of letters.

Cited and trans. id p. 152, slightly adapted above.  Writing and quoting poetry was prevalent among elites in the early Islamic world.  Bonebakker’s writings, at least in English, are far from poetical.  An academic memorial of his life observed:

In spite of his distinguished career in the New World he never fully adjusted to the American way of life and he disliked academic politics and administration; not surprisingly, he and his wife returned to the Netherlands in 1994, settling in the quiet town of Zeist, not far from Leiden.

Bonebakker was born in the Netherlands and became a professor at the University of California at Los Angeles.  Van Gelder (2006) p. 6.

[2] Cited and trans. Bonebakker (2002).

[3] No evidence exists of Geoffrey Chaucer having received payment explicitly as a poet or for his poetry from King Edward III and King Richard II in late fourteenth-century England. Green (1980) p. 6. Minstrels more readily collected material rewards than did poets:

The vocation of minstrel, if it had conferred no great prestige and commanded few lavish rewards, had at least provided its practitioner with a recognized skill for which his employers were willing to offer material encouragement; the household poet, on the other hand, practiced an avocation which he shared with his superiors, and he would have been presumptuous, but also ill-advised, to seek direct recognition for it. … Account books throughout the {European} late middle ages are full of payments to minstrels (for musical not literary services, of course), but provide little evidence of direct encouragement for writers of love poetry in England

Id. p. 127.

References:

Bonebakker, Seeger A. 2001.  “The Misery of the Men of Letters: Some Quotations from their Poetry.” Quaderni di Studi Arabi,  v. 19, 147-161.

Bonebakker, Seeger A.  2002. “Supplement: Variations on the Theme of Ḥirfat al-adab .”  Quaderni di Studi Arabi, v. 20, pp. 17-38.

Gelder, Geert Jan van. 2006. “Seeger A. Bonebakker in Memoriam.” Quaderni di Studi Arabi, Nuova Serie, v. 1, pp. 5-6.

Green, Richard Firth. 1980. Poets and princepleasers: literature and the English court in the late Middle Ages. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.