Month: July 2015

The vastly disproportionate incarceration of men relative to women results in part from anti-men sex discrimination in the administration of criminal justice. Anti-men sex bias is also built into criminal law itself. A stark example is criminalizing men seducing women. Criminalizing seduction hasn’t criminalized women seducing men. Moreover, men historically have been highly disproportionately burdened with the role of soliciting amorous relationships. Even if seduction law were facially gender-neutral, criminalizing seduction would have a greatly disparate impact on men. Initiatives to criminalize “rape by deception” function similarly to laws criminalizing seduction.[1] In a society that truly values equal justice under law, men seducing women shouldn’t be a crime.

Since late in the nineteenth century, men seducing women has been a crime in jurisdictions covering almost all the U.S. population. While statutory and case law varies, the crime of seduction has been generally understood as:

the act of a male person in having intercourse with a woman of chaste character under the promise of marriage, or by the use of enticement or persuasion. [2]

Seduction typically has been a felony offense. Some criminal codes criminalized seduction more broadly. The Michigan criminal code currently states:

Any man who shall seduce and debauch any unmarried woman shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not more than 5 years or by fine of not more than 2,500 dollars; but no prosecution shall be commenced under this section after 1 year from the time of committing the offense. [3]

Between 2002 and 2008, more than 30 men were convicted in Michigan for this felony crime of seduction.

Only men can be guilty of the crime of seduction. Women’s sexual allure and seductive power is pervasively presented in popular media. Nonetheless, the crime of seduction is explicitly limited to men seducing women.  Legal scholars, even within our current culture of intense concern about gender, tend to take for granted sex discrimination in considering seduction and rape. Anti-men gender bias in defining crimes of seduction and rape probably reflects in part gender stereotyping from the vast over-representation of men among incarcerated persons. That anti-men gender bias is also consistent with the devaluation of damages to men from forced financial fatherhood that can arise from seduction and rape.

Criminalizing men seducing women has centered on men seducing women with promises of marriage. In the crime of seduction, the element “promise to marry” is merely seductive speech. Issues of due consideration, meeting of minds, legally relevant intent, and formal contracting don’t figure in courts considering men’s seductive promises to marry. A man might verbally promise to marry in the heat of passionate embrace. That’s much different from a promise to marry in a formal engagement ceremony. A man might promise to marry and then change his mind. Yet under laws criminalizing men seducing women, only the man’s expressed promise to marry is significant. The criminalization of seduction under “promise to marry” is criminalization of men’s seductive speech, not criminalization of men breaking a legally cognizable commitment to marry.

The criminalization of men seducing women has in some jurisdictions encompassed a broad range of men’s sexual expression. In a 1904 case before the Supreme Court of Washington, a man was accused of seducing a woman of age twenty-one. The man had been visiting the woman twice a week at her father’s house. After about eight months of such courtship, the man proposed marriage, and the woman accepted. They agreed to a marriage date two years in the future. Immediately after the marriage had been set, the man solicited sex from the woman. She refused for a week or two. The man told her that if she got pregnant, he would marry her right away. They then frequently had consensual sex. About four months later, the woman recognized that she was pregnant. She told the man to marry her immediately. He refused. He then was charged with seduction. The Washington statute stated:

If any person seduce and debauch any unmarried woman of previously chaste character, he shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary not more than five years, or by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars and imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year. If before judgment upon an indictment the defendant marry the woman thus seduced, it is a bar to any further prosecution for the offense. [4]

The question before the Supreme Court was whether the man had seduced the woman to whom he was engaged. The Court reasoned:

The word ‘seduce,’ in this statute, is used in its ordinary legal meaning, and implies the use of arts, persuasion, or wiles to overcome the resistance of the female who is not disposed of her own volition to step aside from the path of virtue. No doubt, the most common method of enticing an unmarried, virtuous woman from rectitude is by promises of marriage; but there are other arts, wiles, and promises which may be made, and which may be acted upon by a virtuous woman. If our statute had intended to limit seduction only to those cases where there was a promise of marriage, it would have said so, as has been done in other states. Not having said so, we must conclude that any seductive arts or promises, where the female involuntarily and reluctantly yields thereto, are sufficient {for finding a man having committed the crime of seduction}. [5]

The Court thus upheld convicting the man for seduction. Under the Court’s definition of the crime of seduction, a large share of men have, at some point in their lives, been guilty of the felony crime of seduction.

Seduction law in action underscores the anti-men gender bias in criminal law. Seduction statutes specify men as offenders and women as victims. Requirements in statutes that women be “of chaste character” have little significance to actual judicial rulings. Requirements for corroborating testimony are eviscerated in practice.[6] The claim “he promised to marry me” essentially serves as a potent legal weapon for women. A woman could easily summon criminal punishment upon a man with whom she had sex and who wouldn’t marry her. “Shotgun marriage” isn’t a hillbilly institution; men have commonly been forced into marriage by criminal law. More recent laws force financial fatherhood on men, with the threat of imprisonment even in the absence of counsel. Those laws reflect the same structure of gynocentrism.

In response to criminally charging a man with seducing a woman, marriage between them served as an alternative to incarceration in shackling the man’s bodily self-possession. In the U.S. about 1965, thirty-seven states encompassing 83% of the U.S. population had explicit statutory law criminalizing a man seducing a woman (the crime of seduction). Marriage was a recognized legal defense in thirty-one of those states.[7] The Court of Appeals of Kentucky in 1894 explained Kentucky’s seduction statute:

It seeks to provide for the woman and her issue, if any. It cares not for the man, except to punish him; and the punishment prescribed is to force him to keep his promise, rather than go to the penitentiary. [8]

Some seduction statutes explicitly stated that the charge of seduction was merely suspended pending the man serving a given number of years of marriage. In Georgia, a man charged with seducing a woman had to serve five years of marriage before his seduction charge would be dismissed. In addition, he was required to post a bond for the financial support of his wife and any children.[9] Reviewing a seduction case, the Harvard Law Review in 1903 declared:

Even as a matter of policy, however, it seems questionable whether the subsequent marriage should be treated as an absolute defense {to the crime of a man seducing a woman}; for the end desired would seem to be more effectively reached by merely refraining from the prosecution in cases where the defendant was willing in good faith to fulfill his marital obligations, still reserving the power to prosecute where, as in the principal case, the defendant has gone through the form of marriage merely to escape responsibility. [10]

In the shadow of the law, many men undoubtedly married women to avoid a charge of seduction and a potential felony sentence to incarceration.

Crimes of seduction and “rape by deception” support dominant public practices of bodily dispossessing men. The most prevalent, state-institutionalized practices of bodily dispossession are compulsory military service and incarceration. Conscription and related practices, e.g. U.S. Selective Service registration, explicitly target men for bodily dispossession. Criminal justice around the world highly disproportionately incarcerates men. Under the currently dominant understanding of rape, highly authoritative, scientific surveys indicate that more women rape men than men rape women. Men being seduced by women and men being raped by women are nonetheless largely matters of laughter, scorn, and denial. The definitions of crimes reflect deeply entrenched anti-men bias in public concern about bodily self-possession.[11]

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Read more:

• Mann Act criminalized men’s sexual activity
• contract & fraud irrelevant to forced financial fatherhood
• violence kills four times more men than women

Notes:

[1] Anglo-American common law historically hasn’t criminalized rape by deception, with two exceptions. A man impersonating a woman’s husband in order to have consensual sex with her has been legally defined as rape. A doctor having sex with a woman by claiming that sex to be a medical treatment has also been legally defined as rape. Rubenfeld (2013) pp. 1395-7.

Legal scholars and criminalization activists have for decades been pushing to expand criminalization of rape by deception. In recent years, U.S. colleges and universities have been enacting new sex regulations that greatly expand the definition of sex crimes. Id. Consider the symbolic violence against men in this statement in a scholarly article published in 2005:

The belief that male aggression and female passivity in the sex act comprise moments of seduction instead of coercion is one of several rape myths that effectively equates consent with its opposite.

That sentence ends with a footnote citing a statement in a 1995 scholarly article:

It may not be that rape is forced seduction but that seduction is a subtler form of rape.

Donovan (2005) p. 63, with footnote quoting a scholarly article published in 1995.

[2] Humble (1921) pp. 144-5. In 1962, the Proposed Official Draft of the Model Penal Code declared:

A male who has intercourse with a female not his wife … is guilty of an offense if … the other person is a female who is induced to participate by a promise of marriage which the actor does not mean to perform.

Quoted in Wadlington (1967) p. 192. Anti-men sex discrimination has long characterized both the definition of rape and adjudication of rape claims.

[3] Michigan Penal Code § 750.532. College sex crime tribunals don’t typically impose a time limit on allegations. In response to a two-year-old complaint of non-consensual sexual contact, Brandeis University placed the accused student on “emergency suspension,” tarred him with a guilty finding in a travesty of fair process, and on that finding issued him a “Disciplinary Warning” that became part of his academic record.

[4] Washington Criminal Code, Section 7066, 2 Ballinger’s Ann. Codes & St., cited in State v. O’Hare (1904), 68 L.R.A. 107, 36 Wash. 516, 79 P. 39.

[5] State v. O’Hare (1904), 68 L.R.A. 107. The Supreme Court of Iowa declared that to seduce (in the context of criminalizing men seducing women) means “to draw away from the path of rectitude and duty in any manner, by flattery, promises, bribes, or otherwise.” The Supreme Court declared that allegation of specific seductive acts isn’t necessary to support a charge of seduction against a man. Brown v. Kingsley, 38 Iowa 220 (1874). The Supreme Court of Iowa subsequently found that a man obtaining sex by means of “caresses and flatteries” had thereby committed the crime of seduction. Hawn v. Banghart, 39 N.W. 251, 14 Am.St.Rep. 261 (1888). The judicial intent seems to have been to punish a man for sex likely to be subject to popular disapproval.

Blackstone noted that Roman law criminalized a man consensually eloping with a woman. The man faced the penalty of death for that crime. The woman who consensually eloped with the man wasn’t subject to criminal charges. With a wryness that eludes modern misandristic legal scholarship, Blackstone observed:

our English law does not entertain quite such sublime ideas of the honour of either sex as to lay the blame of a mutual fault upon one of the transgressors only; and therefore makes it a necessary ingredient in the crime of rape that it must be against the woman’s will.

Blackstone (1769 / 1908) Bk. 4, Ch. 15, Sec. III. Blackstone under-estimated modern ideology for criminalizing men. Under the U.S. Mann Act of 1910 (“White-Slave Traffic Act”), men were criminalized for consensually eloping with women across state lines. For modern misandristic legal scholarship promoting greater criminalization and incarceration of men, see e.g. Coughlin (1998) and VanderVelde (1996).

[6] CLM (1882) pp. 336-43, Humble (1921) p. 152.

[7] See the table of U.S. state seduction laws ca. 1965 (Excel version), based on Wadlington (1967) p. 189, n. 38; p. 193, n. 66. Marriage as defense provisions covered 89% of the population in states with laws criminalizing seduction.

In most jurisdictions, the man offering to marry the woman wasn’t sufficient to suspend criminal prosecution of him. The woman’s decision of whether to accept the man’s offer of marriage determined whether the state would suspend criminal prosecution of the man. See ruling and discussion of authoritative views in the Supreme Court of Mississippi’s decision Williams v. State, 92 Miss. 70, 45 So. 146, 15 Am.Ann.Cas. 1026 (1908).

[8] Commonwealth v. Wright, 16 Ky.L.Rptr. 251 (1894).

[9] Humble (1921) p. 149. Under the seduction law in Arkansas, marriage suspends prosecution for seduction, but the seduction charge may be revived if the marriage breaks up after any period of years. Id. p. 150. Cf. Deuteronomy 22:28. The Oklahoma seduction law specifies a penitentiary sentence not to exceed five years for a man convicted of seducing a woman. The law also specifies:

the penalty for abandonment or intolerable cruelty which causes the wife to leave within two years after a marriage which took place between the parties pending a seduction charge may vary from two to twenty years of penitentiary confinement.

Wadlington (1967) p. 195, n. 82, citing Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 1120 (1958).

[10] HLR (1903) p. 63. On marriage as punishment, Murray (2012). As is typical of current legal scholarship, Murray ignores the acute anti-men bias in criminal punishment.

[11] Rubenfeld (2013) puts forward self-possession as the formal legal logic of rape law. Rubenfeld seems oblivious to the anti-men bias in violating self-possession. But Rubenfeld does seem to recognize the potential danger of encroaching upon normative beliefs that now strictly discipline elite discourse. Elite discourse about rape trivializes women raping men and insistently privileges women with gynocentric myths. That anti-men gender bias is readily apparent in the Yale Law Journal’s forum on Rubenfeld’s article.

[image] Shata Prison. Thanks to Ori and Wikipedia.

References:

Blackstone, William, ed. by George Sharswood. 1769 / 1908. Commentaries on the laws of England. Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co.

CLM. 1882. “Seduction as a Crime.” Criminal Law Magazine 3(3): 331-47.

Coughlin, Anne M. 1998. “Sex and Guilt.” Virginia Law Review. 84 (1): 1-46.

Donovan, Brian. 2005. “Gender Inequality and Criminal Seduction: Prosecuting Sexual Coercion in the Early-20th Century.” Law & Social Inquiry. 30 (1): 61-88.

HLR. 1903. “Recent Cases.” Harvard Law Review. 17(1): 55-64.

Humble, H. W. 1921. “Seduction as a Crime.” Columbia Law Review. 21 (2): 144-154.

Murray, Melissa. 2012. “Marriage as Punishment.” Columbia Law Review. 112 (1): 1-65.

Rubenfeld, Jed. 2013. “The riddle of rape-by-deception and the myth of sexual autonomy.” Yale Law Journal. 122 (6): 1372-1443.

VanderVelde, Lea. 1996. “The Legal Ways of Seduction.” Stanford Law Review. 48 (4): 817-901.

Wadlington, Walter. 1967. “Shotgun Marriage by Operation of Law.” Georgia Law Review 1: 183-204.

The fifth-century Athenian philosopher Socrates was associated in Greco-Roman literature with rationalizing his wife Xanthippe’s abusive behavior. Socrates, a radical critic of Athenian society, apparently was reluctant to criticize his own wife. In the transmission of Socrates’s wisdom through the Islamic world and early medieval Europe, Socrates’s acceptance of Xanthippe’s abusive behavior was transformed into Socrates’s general disparagement of women. That represents a failure of substantive critique that continues in the classical tradition today.

Xenophon, a student of Socrates, wrote a dialogue featuring Socrates. In that dialogue, Socrates’s interlocutor described Xanthippe as “the hardest to get along with of all the women there are—yes, or all that ever were, I suspect, or ever will be.” He asked Socrates why he chose to live with such a wife. Socrates explained:

I observe that men who wish to become expert horsemen do not get the most docile horses but rather those that are high-mettled, believing that if they can manage this kind, they will easily handle any other. My course is similar. Human beings at large is what I wish to deal and associate with; and so I have got her, well assured that if I can endure her, I shall have no difficulty in my relations with all the rest of human kind. [1]

In medieval Europe, the ideology of amour courtois taught men that toiling for women’s love made them better men. In Xenophon’s dialogue, Socrates argued that his shrewish wife Xanthippe made him more socially capable. Both are rationalizations for oppressive circumstances.

Socrates’s excuses for Xanthippe’s abusive behavior seem to have expanded across Greco-Roman history. A Roman philosopher writing about the time of Jesus observed that Socrates laughed heartily “when his wife Xanthippe drenched him with foul water.”[2] Writing about 250 GC, a biographer of Greek philosophers stated:

When Xanthippe first scolded him and then drenched him with water, his rejoinder was, “Did I not say that Xanthippe’s thunder would end in rain?” [3]

Laughing at abuse and naturalizing it through analogy to the weather are strategies to cope with helplessness. In other domestic incidents, Socrates similarly combined laughter and passivity:

They {Xanthippe and the woman Myrto} engaged in conflict with one another, and when they stopped {attacking each other}, they attacked Socrates, because he never prevented their battles but laughingly watched them fighting both himself and one another. [4]

Alcibiades sent Socrates a large and beautifully made cake. Xanthippe was annoyed in her usual way, treating the cake as a present sent by a favourite boy to his lover to reinforce his passion, so she emptied it out of the basket and trod on it. Socrates laughed and said: “Well, you won’t get any of it either.” [5]

Domestic violence against men today is largely trivialized and ignored. Socrates’s response to Xanthippe is consistent with similar trivialization of domestic violence against men in the Greco-Roman world.

Socrates responded defensively to a close friend challenging Xanthippe’s abusive behavior. The biographer of Greek philosophers reported:

When Alcibiades declared that the scolding of Xanthippe was intolerable, “No, I’ve gotten used to it,” said he {Socrates}, “like the continued rattle of a windlass. You yourself don’t mind the cackle of geese.” “No,” replied Alcibiades, “but they furnish me with eggs and goslings.” “And Xanthippe,” said Socrates, “is the mother of my children.” [6]

Alcibiades was Socrates’s intimate friend. He surely knew that Xanthippe was the mother of Socrates’s children. Socrates’s argument seems to rest implicitly on the idea that he can find no other woman with whom to have children in a loving, respectful relationship. Men today stay in abusive relationships to protect their children given acute anti-men bias in child custody awards. Anti-men bias in child custody decisions in ancient Greek isn’t explicitly attested. However,  anti-men bias in child custody decisions is scarcely acknowledged today. In the context of Xanthippe’s abuse of him, Socrates’s statement “Xanthippe is the mother of my children” makes best sense as a statement of his lack of meaningful choices as a father.

Socrates also responded defensively to acquaintances challenging Xanthippe’s abusive behavior. A historian writing in Greek in the Roman Empire about 100 GC reported:

Once when Socrates took Euthydemus home with him from the wrestling school, Xanthippe came up to them in a rage and scolded them roundly, finally upsetting the table. Euthydemus, deeply offended, got up and was about to leave when Socrates said, “At your house the other day did not a hen fly in and do precisely this same thing, yet we were not put out about it?” [7]

Socrates thus trivialized Xanthippe’s abusive behavior. The biographer of Greek philosophers stated:

When she {Xanthippe} tore his coat off his back in the market-place and his acquaintances advised him to hit back, “Yes, by Zeus,” said he, “in order that while we are sparring each of you may join in with ‘Go to it, Socrates!’ ‘Well done, Xanthippe!'” [8]

Men in fifth-century Athens were intensely concerned about their honor. A man fighting with a woman was socially constructed as shameful in fifth-century Athens, just as it is now. That construction of honor and shame allows women to abuse men physically with impunity.

In the early Roman Empire, elite men were reluctant to marry. At that time, Socrates was associated with resigned acceptance of men’s unhappiness with their familial relations:

Socrates also, when consulted by a young fellow whether to take a wife or keep away from matrimony altogether, replied that whichever he did he would be sorry. “On the one hand,” he said, “you will fall prey to loneliness and childlessness and the extinction of your line and an alien heir, on the other to perpetual anxiety, a tissue of complaints, harping on the dowry, the haughty frown of in-laws, the clacking tongue of your wife’s mother, the lurking paramour, the doubtful outcome of children.” He did not allow the young man in a context of disagreeable outcomes to think that he was making a choice of happiness. [9]

Juvenal and Jerome responded to the passive acceptance of men’s unhappiness with vigorous exhortations to men and women to remain unmarried. Men today under the banner of MGTOW (Men Going Their Own Way) reject oppressive relations with women. Yet, all in all, well-educated men and women today rationalize women’s abusive behavior more comprehensively than Socrates did in the Greco-Roman world. That makes marriage much less attractive to men than it could be.

Socrates’s acceptance of his wife Xanthippe’s abusive behavior evolved into Socrates expressing general contempt for women. In Greek apophthegms transmitted mainly through the eastern Roman Empire to medieval Europe, Socrates declared:

I have met with three evils – grammar, poverty, and a damned woman. I made my escape from two of them, but I could not escape the damned woman.

Better to bury a woman than to marry one. For I am a demon to myself, having married. [10]

In medieval Arabic literature, Socrates regarded women as evil and marriage as worse than death. One Arabic story:

When Socrates was told that a certain personal enemy of his had died, he said: “I wish you had broken to me the news about his having got married.” [11]

According to Socrates in medieval Arabic literature:

Women resemble a trap, and marriage Socrates likened to a fisherman’s net: those fish which are outside wish to get in and those inside wish to get out. [12]

In a Hebrew text drawing upon Arabic literature and written in Spain about 1200, Socrates declared that he chose a short wife so as to have “the least of the evil.” In another apophthegm from that text, one of Socrates’s disciples gazed upon a beautiful women. Socrates warned against such gazing. The disciple explained that he was merely admiring God’s craftsmanship. Socrates responded, “Turn her inside out; then you will understand her ugliness.”[13] An eleventh-century Arabic text containing Socratic wisdom was translated into Spanish in the first half of the thirteenth century, then into Latin, French, and English. The English versions of the second half of the fifteenth century recorded:

{Socrates} said that there are no such great obstacles to men as ignorance and women. And he saw a woman carrying fire, of whom he said that the hotter carried the colder. And he saw a woman sick, of whom he said that evil rests and dwells with evil. And he saw a woman being carried to criminal execution, and many other women followed her weeping, of whom he said that the evil be sorry and angry because the evil shall perish.[14]

In that text, Socrates expanded considerably further the theme that women are evil. Yet of Xanthippe the text says only that she was “the worst woman that was in all that country {Greece}.”[15] In Arabic literature, Xanthippe “appears in a favorable light as a loving, though simple wife, concerned with her husband’s fate.”[16] Socrates’s general contempt for women reversed in particularity and values Socrates’s excuses for Xanthippe’s abusive behavior.

Following the lead of the celebrated medieval author Christine de Pizan, more recent literature has upheld Socrates’s classical tradition of excusing and rationalizing Xanthippe’s abusive behavior. In its entry for Xanthippe, an important reference work on the classical tradition observed:

Although a strong tide of prejudices and proverbs has run against her, Xanthippe has had defenders. At the turn of the 15th century Christin de Pizan presented her laudatorily in The Book of the City of Ladies (2.21.1). In 1865 Eduard Zeller published an essay, “To Save the Honor of Xanthippe” (in Vorträge und Abhandlungen geschichtlichen Inhalts); in 1884 Fritz Mauthner made a case in her favor in a novel, Xanthippe; in 1944 the Austrian Hanns Sassmann also wrote a novel in her cause; and in 1960 Stefan Paul Andres published 12 stories in her defense. [17]

Consistent with gynocentrism, discussion of Xanthippe’s behavior has focused on women:

The name {Xanthippe} has been invoked often, both pro and con, in discussions of women’s rights and in other feminist causes, as in a dialogue entitled “Xanthippe on Woman Suffrage” by Duffield Osborne in the Yale Review for 1915 (4:590-670); in a pamphlet, Xanthippe: San Jose Women’s Liberation, issued in 1971 by the Xanthippe Collective of San Jose, California; in the names of bookships and printing presses; and in a section of a novel by Cynthia Ozick, The Puttermesser Papers (1997). [18]

The classical tradition remains important today.  Appreciating the full richness of human literature throughout history can help to imagine a more loving future for women and men.

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Read more:

• Galenic saying shows long-run changes in personal competition
• domestic violence in fabliau and farce
• rape: a fundamental principle of communication economics

Notes:

[1] Xenophon, Symposium, 2.10, from Greek trans. Todd (1921). The previous quote is from id. This passage came to circulate independently as a chreia — a brief narrative saying attributed to a well-known person. A chreia is a specific type of apophthegm. Versions of this chreia circulated in Greek, Arabic, and Latin. Greek: Putarch, Moralia, De capienda ex inimicis utilitate (How to profit from one’s enemies) 90s (sec. 8), Aulus Gellis, Attic Nights, 1.171, SAWS (2013). Arabic: Alon (1991) p. 53. Latin: e.g. John of Salisbury, Policraticus, Bk. 5, Ch. 10, in Nederman (1990) p. 89. The truthfulness of these stories is less important than their cultural significance.

[2] Seneca the Younger, De constantia sapientis (On Firmness) XVIII.5, from Latin trans. John W. Basore, Loeb Classical Library, 1928-1935.

[3] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers) Bk. 2, Ch. 36, (written in the first half of the third century GC), from Greek trans. Robert Drew Hicks, Loeb Classical Library, 1925. This chreia occurs in Jerome, Adversus Jovinianum, I.48 (written 393 GC). It is referenced briefly in Athenaeus, Deipnosophists (Banquet of the Learned) 5.219b (written early in the third century GC), from Greek trans. Charles Burton Gulick, Loeb Classical Library, 1928. Versions of this chreia circulated in Greek, Latin, and English in medieval Europe. Greek: SAWS (2013). Latin: e.g. Heloise’s first letter to Abelard s. 25. English: Chaucer, “Wife of Bath’s Prologue” ll. 727-732, Canterbury Tales. In ibn Zabara’s Hebrew Book of Delight (written about 1200), this chreia is attributed to a certain washerwoman. Hadas (1932) pp. 66-7.

[4] Theodoret, Graecarum Affectionum Curatio (early fifth century GC), from Greek trans. Mclean (2002) p. 12. Cyril of Alexandria, Against Julian, includes similar text. Myrto was a widow whom Socrates took as a second wife or concubine, according to various ancient sources.

[5] Aelian, Varia Historia (Historical Miscellany) XI.12 (early third century GC), from Greek trans. Nigel Guy Wilson, Loeb Classical Library, 1997.

[6] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers) Bk. 2, Ch. 36, trans. Robert Drew Hicks.

[7] Plutarch, Moralia, De cohibenda ira (On the Control of Anger) 461d (sec. 13), from Greek trans. Loeb Classical Library, 1939. In On contentment 11, Plutarch tells a similar story of Pitticus and his wife. A friend comments about Pitticus:

In public this man is an object of envy, but as soon as he opens the door of his home, he’s in a pitiful state: his wife is in complete control, she bosses him about and argues all the time. He’s got rather a lot of reasons to be miserable, whereas I’ve got none.

The intended implication seems to be that the friend was unmarried.

[8] Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum (Lives of the Eminent Philosophers) Bk. 2, Ch. 36, trans. Robert Drew Hicks.

[9] Valerius Maximus, Factorum ac dictorum memorabilium libri IX (Memorable Doings and Sayings) Bk. VII, ii ext. 1, from Latin trans. Shackleton Bailey (2000) p. 115.

[10] SAWS (2013).

[11] Alon (1991) p. 151.

[12] Id. p. 152. Les Quinze Joyes de Mariage (French, about 1400) similarly compares women to a trap and men caught in marriage to fish in a net.

[13] Ibn Zabara, Book of Delight, trans. Hadas (1932) p. 66. The previous quote is from id.

[14] The Dicts And Sayings Of The Philosophers, 11 Socrates, ll. 419-25, in modernized English. Mubashshir ibn Fatik composed a collection of dicts and sayings in Arabic in the eleventh century. It is known as Mukhtar al-hikam. In the first half of the thirteenth century, that work was translated into Spanish as Bocados de Oro. In the second half of the thirteenth century, Bocados de Oro was translated into Latin as Liber Philosophorum Moralium Antiquorum. Guillaume de Tignonville translated that into French about a century later to create a work known as Dits Moraulx. That work was translated into English several times between 1450 and 1500. William Caxton printed an English version, The Dicts and Sayings of the Philosophers, in 1477. That may have been the first book printed in England. This summary of textual history is based mainly on John William Sutton’s introduction to his critical edition of The Dicts and Sayings of the Philosophers.

[15] Dicts And Sayings, 11 Socrates, l. 4.

[16] Alon (1991) p. 54.

[17] Grafton, Most & Settis (2010) p. 996. Id. refers to Xanthippe’s character having been “besmirched” and “the defamation of Xanthippe.” A recent post on Classical Wisdom Weekly provided “Five Reasons Why Socrates Was a Terrible Husband.” That post shows the listicle style and thematic targeting used to attract attention on the Internet.

[18] Grafton, Most & Settis (2010) pp. 996-7.

[images] (1) Xanthippe empties a chamber-pot on Socrates’s head, from Emblemata Horatiana, Imaginibus In Aes Incisis Atque Latino, Germanico, Gallico Et Belgico Carmine Illustrata by Otho Vaenius, 1607. Thanks to Wikimedia Commons. A latter edition, Q. Horatii Flacci Emblemata (1612), has the engraving reversed. (2) Patientia Socratis (patient Socrates): on left, Xanthippe pours a chamber-pot over Socrates’s head; on right, Xanthippe and Myrto kick and hit Socrates. Emblem 33 in Emblems, engraved by Gerard de Jode, with accompanying verses from Laurentius Haechtanus. Antwerp: 1579.

References:

Alon, Ilai. 1991. Socrates in medieval Arabic literature. Jerusalem: Hebrew University.

Grafton, Anthony, Glenn W. Most, and Salvatore Settis. 2010. The classical tradition. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Hadas, Moses, trans. 1932. Joseph ben Meir ibn Zabara. The book of delight {Sefer Sha’ashu’im}. New York: Columbia University Press.

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